People v. Gonzales by Traynor, Roger J.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository




Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, People v. Gonzales 20 Cal.2d 165 (1942).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/56
\. 
164 PLUM,MER V. SUPERIOR COURT [20 C. (2d) 
Applying the foregoing rule to the case at bar we find that, 
even if it' be assumed that the agreement was so incorporated 
into the decree that an order for compliance therewith could 
be implied, there ,is nothing in the agreement which neces-
sarily shows an intent to make it a part of a future divorce 
decree. Nothing is said therein regarding the approval of the 
agreement by the court, nor that it should become a part of 
a subsequent decree. The rcference therein to the payments 
being for maintenance and support, and a release of all 
other claims for support are wholly consistent with the 
agreement being in view of separation with no divorce in-
volved. The agreement is complete in itself. However, the 
divorce decrees do not order or direct either party to do or 
perform any act or carry out any provision or stipulation pro-
vided for in the agreement. The interlocutory decree simply 
by way of recital states that a copy of the contract "annexed 
hereto and made a part hereof ... is hereby ratified, ap-
proved and confirmed." The final decree contains a similar 
recital. 
In the Lazar case, supra, certain provisions of the agree-
ment were set forth in the decree in haec verba following the 
words "It is ordered, adjudged and decreed" that the acts 
provided for therein be performed. In other words, the court 
expressly ordered that such provisions be performed. Such 
is not the case here, and it cannot be said that it was the 
, intention of either the parties or the court that the provisions 
of the agreement be made a part of the decrees to the extent 
they were reduced to a final mandatory judgment, ordering' 
and commanding the performance of certain acts, a failure to 
perform which would constitute a contempt of court. 
The rights of the parties under a mandatory judgment 
whereby they may be subjected to punishment as contemnors 
for a violation of its provisions, should not rest upon impli-
cation or conjecture, but' the language declaring such rights 
or imposing burdens should be clear, specific and unequivocal 
so that the parties may not be misled thereby. . 
Situations may arise where a trial court may be disposed 
to approve a property settlement agreement in a divorce 
action, and for the purpose of identifying such agreement, 
cause the same to be annexed to the interlocutory decree of 
. divorce, but for obvious reasons would refrain from making a 
mandatory order that the parties be required to perform each 
and every' provision of such agreement or be subjected to a 
" 
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charge of contempt of court for failure to do so. It is a matter 
of common knowledge that such agreements often contain pro-
visions which cannot be specifically enforced, and it would be 
idle for a court to make a mandatory order directing the per-
formance of such provisions. In those cases where it is the 
intention of the parties and the court to have certain provi-
sions of such an agreement constitute a part of the decree or 
judgment and made enforceable as such, the court may set 
forth such provisions in the decree and provide therein that 
the same be performed. This is the usual practice and when 
it is followed all doubt as to the effect of such provisions is 
removed. 
No such ,intention appears from the decrees in the case at 
bar, and we therefore hold that the provisions of the agree. 
ment cannot be enforced by a contempt proceeding. 
The peremptory writ of mandate prayed for is denied. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Houser, J., and Tray. 
nor, J., concurred. 
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied April 30, 
1942. Edmonds, J., voted for a rehearing. 
rCrim. No. 4382. In Bank. Apr. 2, 1942.J 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. JOHN GONZALES 
Appellants. et aI., 
[1] Criminal Law-Evidence-Unlawful Seizure.-The fact that 
evidence was obtained by an illegal search and seizure docs 
not Ilffect its admissibility. 
[28, 2b] ld. - Evidence - Unlawful Seizure _ Fairness of Trial, 
Effect on.-While an unreasonable search and seizure may 
constitute a violation of due process of law, the use of evi-
[1] Evidence obtained byillllgal search and seizure, note, 88 
A. L. R. 3-18. See, also, 8 Cal. Jur. 78; 20 Am. Jur. 352. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Criminal Law, § 4l0; [3] Consti. 
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§ 17; [5] Witnosses, § 141; [6] Conspiracy, § 25; [7J COllspiracy, 
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dcnce so obtained docs not constitute a denial of due proce:>s 
of hl,Y' .• since that does not affect the fairness or impartiality 
of the trial. 
Ooustitutional Law - Due Process - Criminal Trial, Appli-
cation to.-A. criminnl trial docs not constitute a denial of due 
process of law so long as it is fair and impartial. 
Criuinal Law-Evidence-Injunction Agaiust Testifying: Ap-
peal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Evidence:, Injunctions 
. -Matters Controllable-Testimony.-Thc issuance of an in-
jUllction . restraining a person from testifying as to a matter 
is . improper. And it is not error for a court at a criminal 
trial to permit testimony in violation of such an injunction. 
In any event, any· error in so doing is not prejudicial where 
the testimony cannot be excluded on a new trial in view of 
the' holding of the appellate court that it is admissible, and 
of the affirmance of the order denying the injunction. 
Witnosses-1.·dross~examination - Subject Matter-Injunction 
Against Testifying.-On cross-examination of a witn(;ss for 
-the' prosecution, it is proper to sustain objection to a question 
as·to whether the witness had not been enjoined from testify-
ing, since the question is immaterial. 
[6]Oonspiracy - Criminal-Instructions.-In a prosecution for" 
conspiracy, it was not error to refuse a request for a charge 
that in determining the existence of a conspiracy as to each 
defendant testimony as to acts and declarations of the other 
might not be considered, and a further request that the jury 
might not consider acts of an alleged conspirator unless first 
convinced from independent evidence that a conspiracy ex-
isted, where the court gave an instruction to the effect that 
[7] 
in considering the guilt of each defendant the jury should 
consider only evidence admitted against him. Any ambiguity 
in the instruction given by reason of its failure to indicate 
the evidence admitted against each defendant was not preju-
dicial Where, at the time ev'idence as to acts and declarations 
of each defendant was introduced, the court in the presence 
of the jury stated whom it was admitted against. 
Id.-"-Criminal-Evidence-Sufficicncy.-Participation in a con-
spiracy cun be shown by circumstantial evidence. And the evi-
dence is sufficicnt to support a conclusion as to a defendant's 
participation iL a conspiracy to steal by use of a pretended 
money mnking machine where it shows the presence of a bag 
. containing the machine and' ~ttles of liquid in his apartment, 
his possession of the key to the bag, his acquaintanceship 
and association with the other alleged conspirator, and his 
[7] See 5 Cal. Jur. 521, 11 Am. JUl'. 570. 
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exhibition of a large roll of bills to the intended victim, and his 
possession thereof when arrested. 
[8] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Ar-
gument of Counsel-Reference to Extraneous Matters.-In a 
prosecution for a conspiracy to steal, any misconduct of the 
prosecutor during argument in referring to other bunco cases 
was not sufficiently prejudicial to justify a reversal, par-
ticularly in view. of the trial court's refusal to grant a new 
trial on such ground . 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
mty and County of San Francisco and from orders denying 
a new trial. Alfred J. Fritz, JUdge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for conspiracy to commit· grand theft. J udg. 
ment of conviction and orders denying new trial affirmed. 
Leo R. Friedman for Appellants. 
Earl Warren, Attorney General, J. Albert Hutchinson and 
David K. Lener, Deputies Attorney General, Matthew Brady, 
District Attorney, and Joseph A. Garry, Assistant District 
Attorney, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-On June 17, 1940, an indictment was filed 
charging defendants Gonzales and Chierotti with having con-
spired together on May 25, 1940, to commit grand theft by 
fraudulent representations to Secundo Valenzano regarding 
a machine that purportedly could reproduce United States 
currency with the use of certain chemicals. The evidence 
showed that defendant Gonzales, after striking up an acquain-
tance with Secundo Valenzano, told Valenzano that a rich 
man had the machine, that real currency was necessary in 
making the reproductions, and that he would surreptitiously 
get possession of the machine and bring it to Valenzano's 
saloon. He brought the machine there, put some real bills 
into it, used the chemicals, and when the machine was opened, 
there were two bills for each one originally inserted. There-
upon Gonzales told Valenzano that if he could get several 
thousand dollars in new bills, equal to an amount to be fur, 
nished by Gonzales, each could double his money by using 
the machine. Valenzano Pllt up no money but notified the 
police who arrested both Gonzales and Chierotti. 
Valenzano was the only witness who testified to the fore-
. \, 
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going events. Police Officer Iredale testified that on June 6, 
1940, he and Police Officer Linss, without any warrant, au-
thority, or permission, entered the apartment of dcfendant 
Chierotti in the latter's absence and took therefrom a black 
case containing not only bottles of liquid but a machine, 
subsequently identified by Valenzano as that used by Gon-
zales.Chierotti and Gonzales objected to any testimony by 
Officer Iredale regarding the entry and search of Chierotti's 
apartment and the seizure of the case and eontents, as well 
as to the introduction and use of the latter as evidence, on 
the ground that the entry, search, seizure, and use of the 
property violated the rights guaranteed to Chierotti by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States, and the search and seizure and due process clauses 
of the Constitution of California. (Cal. Const., art. I, secs. 
19, 13.) 
Before the commencement of the trial Chierotti sought an 
injunction ill an independent proceeding against the San 
Francisco Police Department and Officer Iredale to enjoin 
the use of. the case and contents at the trial and to restrain 
Officer Iredale from testifying to anything he saw, did or 
heard while engaged in his search and seizure. The court de- ~, 
nied the injunction and Chierotti appealed to .this court. 
Pending determination of the appeal, the lower court granted 
a temporary injunction restraining Officer Iredale. from tes-
tifying with regard to the entry into Chierotti's apartment. 
Many months before the trial Chierotti filed a written; motion 
for an order directing the returp to him of the case and con-
tents, and the exclusion from evidence, not only of this prop-
erty, but of any testimony of the officers regarding the search 
and 'seizureor based on information acquired as a result: 
thereof. The motion was denied. At the trial the court re" 
fuSed to.enforce the temporary injunction, allowing Officer 
Iredale to testify in direct defiance thereof. The defendants 
were found guilty.by the jury. After judgment was pro-
llOUllced e/!-ch defendant ~ppealed to this court from the order, 
depying 9.is motion for a new trial and from the judgment. 
. [1] The Fourth Amendment to the Co:qstit'qtioD. of the 
United. States prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures 
by fede~al; qfficers .. '. Pursuant to this mandate the federal 
cOJll'ts forbid the introduction in court of evidence. obtained 
by an illegal search or seizure if a timely motion for its 
exclusion is made by the accused. (Byar~ v. United States, 
g73 U,,:S. 28 [47 S. Ct. 248, 71 L. Ed. 520] ; Go-Bart Im-
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porting 00. v. United States, 283 U. S. 344 [51 S. Ct. 153, 
75 L. Ed. 374] ; Gouled v. United States, 252 U. S. 298, 302 
[41 S. Ct. 261, 65 L. Ed. 647] ; Silverthorne Lumber 00. v. 
United States, 251 U. S. 385 [40 S. Ct. 182, 64 L. Ed. 319] ; 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 [6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. 
Ed. 746] ; Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 [34 S. Ct. 
341, 58 L. Ed. 652] ; Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338 
[60 S. Ct. 266, 84 L. Ed. 307] ; Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 
727, 733 [24 L. Ed. 877] ; Amos v. United States, 252 U.S. 
313[41 S. Ct. 266, 65 L. Ed. 654] ; Agnello v. United States, 
269 U. S. 20 [46 S. Ct. 4, 70 L. Ed. 145].) The California 
Constitution contains an identical provision (Cal. Const., art. 
I, sec. 19),but the accepted rule in this state, as in many 
others, permits the introduction of improperly obtained evi-
dence on the ground that the illegality of the search and 
seizure does not affect the admissibility of the evidence. (Peo-
plev. Mayen; 188 Cal. 237 [205 Pac. 435, 24 A. L. R. 1383] ; 
In re Polizzotto, 188 Cal. 410 [205 Pac. 676]; People v. Le 
Doux. 155 Cal. 535 [102 Pac. 517] ; Herrscher v. State Bar, 
4 Cal.. (2d) 399 [49 P. (2d) 832]. See cases cited in 88 
A. L. R, 348.) The defendant may have civil and crim-
inal rel;lledies against the officers for their illegal acts (see 
Pen. Code, sec. 146; Silva v. MacAuley, 135 Cal. App. 249 
[26 P. (2d) 887, 27 P. (2d) 791]; Ryan v. Orist, 23 Cal. 
App.744 [139 Pac. 436] ; 15 So. Cal. L. Rev. 139, 141 et seq.), 
but the state is not precluded from using the evidence ob-
tained thereby. 
[2a] The Fourth Amendment- to the Constitution of the 
United States is not a limitation upon the states' (National 
Safety Deposit 00. v. Stead, 232 U. S. 58 [34 S. Ct. 209, 58 
L. Ed. 504] ; Ohio v. Dollison, 194 U. S. 445 [24 S. Ct. 703, 
48 L. Ed. 1Q62]), and California is free to interpret its o:.vn 
Constitution. Defendants contend, however, that the prohibi-
tion in the Fourth Amendment of unreasonable searches' and 
seizures is included in the provision of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law,and therefore that under 
the interpretation given to the Fourth Amendment. by the 
federal courts the introduction of evidence obtained by' an 
illegal search and seizure constitutes a denial of due process 
of law. Not all of the first I ten amendments to the federal 
Constitution~ however, fall within the concept of due process 
of law. (Palko v. Oonnecticut, 302 U. S: 319 [58 S. Ct.~49, 
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82, L. Ed.28~] ; Twini.ng v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 [29 S. 
bt. 14, 53 L. Ed. 97] ; Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97 
[:>48. Ct.S30, 78 L. Ed. 674, 90 A. L. R. 575]. See 3V Han 
L.,~ey., 431; 24 Harv. L. Rev. 366.) In the determination of 
wli~ther the .. prohibition against unreasonable searches and 
seizures is included within this concept, the unlawful search 
~nd' seizure must be distinguished from the introduction in 
cQurt oLtheevidence obtained as a result thereof. "The right 
of th~ people, to be ,secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
eff.~'Ctsag~inst unreasonable searches and seizures" may be 
SR ,£1t~d!lD;lclltal as to make any unreasonable search ano. seiz-
~fby: ,a ~'I;!ublic O+pcer a violation of due process ?f law. It 
<loesnot necessarily follow, however, that the use III a court 
oOaw of eyidencethus obtained is so contrary to fundamental 
principles of liberty and justice as to constitute a' denial of 
due', proce,ss q" ~a.w.[3] A criminal trial does not consti-, 
tute~ ;a,dellial Qfdue,process of law so long as it is fair and 
~pai-t,iar:, (Seec~ses Cited in 16 C. J. S., p. 1185 et seq..) There 
is 'a'fBilu:r;e to observe "that fundamental fairness essential 
t,6' the'y~rJ:"concept of justice" when a trial is but a pretense 
(Lisenba v. Calif()rnia, 314 U. S. 219, 236 [62 S. Ct. 280" 
290,861.. Ed. -'-'])1 asa tdal dominated by a mob (Moore ~, 
v. DcrtJ-pscy, 261 U. S. 86 [·.13 S. Ct. 265, 67 L. Ed. 5·13]), or 
whwthe dofcndnnt is denied the right to counsel (Johnson 
v. Zerbst,;S04 U. S. 458 [58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461)), 
or when his conviction results from testimony Imov,n by the 
prosecution to be perjured (Mooney v. Holohan, 29·,:, U. S. 
103 [55S.Ct. 340, 79 L. Ed. 791, 98 A. L. R. 406 J) or from 
an involuntary confession obtained through coercion or .tor-
ture. (Chambers Y. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 [60 S. Ct. 472, 84 
L. Ed. 716] ; Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 [56 S. Ct. 
461, 80 L. Ed. 682].) [2b] While the United States Supreme 
Court has held that the due process clause includes the gU[lr-
antee of the Fifth Amendment against compul.;;ory self-in-
crimination to the extent that the Amendment forbids the use 
of a confession obtained by coercion or tortur6 (Chambers v. 
Florida, supra; Brown v. Mississippi, supraj Lis£nba v. Cali-
fornia, supra. See Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532 [liS 
S. Ct. 183, 42 L. Ed. 568]), it has done so because 11. confes-
sion obtained by coercion or torture is so unreliable thllt its 
use violates all concepts of fairness and justice. (Chambers 
v. Florida, supraj Brown v. Mississippi, supraj Lisenba v. 
California, supra; cf. T'wining v. New Jersey, supra.) The usc 
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of evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure, how-
ever, does not violate due process of law for it does not affect the 
fairness or impartiality of the trial. (People v. Defore, 242 
N. Y. 13 [150 N. E. 585] ; People v. Mayen, supraj Com. v. 
Donnelly, 246 Mass. 507 [141 N. E. 500] ; Johnson v. State, 
152 Ga. 271 [109 S. E. 662,19 A. L. R. 641].) The fact that 
an officer acted improperly in obtaining evidence presented 
at the trial in no way precludes the court from rendC'rin~ a 
fair and impartial judgment. It has long been an estublishrd 
rule of evidence that "the admissibility of evidence is not 
affected by the illegality of the means through which the 
party has been enabled to obtain the evidence." (8 Wigmore, 
Evidence, (3rd. ed.) sec. 2183, p. 5, and cases there cited.) . 
[4] Defendants contend that the trial court should not' 
have permitted Officer Iredale to testify in vie'w of the tem-
porary injunction restraining him from testifying with regard 
to the entry into Chierotti's apartment. Objections to the 
testimony of a witness, however, should be made to the court 
before which he testifies and have no place in an injunction 
proceeding in another court. Any competent person who is 
properly subpoened, and who is not privileged, must appear 
in court and answer questions pertinent to the matter in issue. 
If he refuses to testify he may be punished for contempt of 
court, and no one may lawfUlly prevent or dissuade him from 
testifying. (Code Civ. Proc. secs. 128, 177, 1955, 1986, 1990, 
1991, 1992, 1993; Pen. Code secs. 136, 166, 1331. See cases 
cited in 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed.) sees. 2190-21!j5; 27 
Cal. Jur., p. 9 et seq.) Cleariy it is the objective of these pro-
visions to prevent interference with the testimony of wit-
nesses and the issuance of the temporary injunction was there-
fore improper. Even if it were error for the trial court to 
permit Officer Iredale to testify despite the temporary injunc-
tion it was in no way prejudicial to defendants, for such tes-
timony could not be excluded on a new trial in view of the 
holding herein that the testimony was admissible and the 
affirmance of the order denying an injunction in Chierotti v. 
San FrMteisco Police Department, S. F. 16646, this day de-
cided, post p. 895 [124 P. (2d) 51]. 
[5] On cross-examination defendants' attorney asked Offi-
cer Iredale if he had not been enjoined from testifying con-
cerning anything he had lflarned as a re.<3ult of his illegal 
search of Chierotti's apartment. Defendants contend that 
they had a right to ask this question for the purpose of iIU-
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peaching the credibility oj' the witness by showing interest, 
bias, or prejudice and that the trial court therefore erred in 
sustaining an objection to it. It does not follow, however, that 
a witness would be inclined to testify falsely because he tes-
tified in the face of an injunction. On the contrary, in the 
words of the trial court, "the jury would be more inclined to 
believe the police officer who testified, if he testified despite 
the injunction and order. They would believe he was doing 
his duty." The question was immaterial and the objection 
to it was properly sustained. 
[6] Defendants have also objected to the refusal of the 
trial court to give certain instructions to the jury. Proposed 
instruction number 30 stated: " ... It is the law of thiS state, 
that in determining whether any such conspiracy existed of 
which the defendant Chierotti was a party, that testimony of 
the acts or declarations or the defendant Gonzales cannot be 
considered by you, and it is your duty to disregard all evi-
dence as to any acts or declarations of the defendant Gonzales, 
and to determine the existence or non-existence of such con-
spiracy, so far as defendant Chierotti is concerned, from such 
other evidence as may be in the case against him. The fact 
that an unlawful conspiracy existed of which the defendant 
Chierotti was a member and the unlawful purpose of such 
conspiracy, must be established by evidence, to a moral cer-
tainty and beyond a reasonable doubt, separate and apart 
from and independent of any testimony as to any declarations 
that were made by the defendant Gonzales. In other words, 
in determining whether defendant Chierotti was a member 
of the conspiracy charged you cannot consider any declara-
tion or act that the defendant Gonzales said or did." Pro-
posed instruction number 31 is the same as number 30 except 
that it applies to defendant Gonzales instead of defendant 
Chierotti. Proposed instruction number 32 stated: "You are 
instructed that a conspiracy cannot be proven merely by the 
acts or declarations of an alleged conspirator and that you 
may not consider such acts or declarations unless you are first 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt by entirely independent 
evidence that a conspiracy existed." 
The trial court instructed the jury on the subject of these 
instructions as follows: "The first fundamental question that 
you should determine in this case is: Was there in fact a 
conspiracy formed as charged in the indictment? If you 
answer that question in the negative, you are at an end of 
the case and your verdict should be not guilty, If, on the 
.' 
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other hand, you answer that question in the affirmative, you 
should then determine the question whether these defendants 
actively participated and entered into such conspiracy or 
scheme. In deciding the issues in this case you should take 
into consideration all the evidence admitted in the case, both 
for the State and for the defendants .... In considering the 
guilt or innocence of the defendant Chierotti you must con-
sider only the evidence that has been admitted against him 
and cannot consider any evidence that has been admitted 
only as evidence against the defendant Gonzales. In con-
sidering the guilt or innocence of the defendant Gonzales you 
must consider only the evidence that has been admitted 
against him and cannot consider any evidence that has been 
admitted only as against the defendant Chierotti. You can-
not return a verdict finding one of the defendants guilty 
solely on the ground that you find the evidence sufficient to 
est:tblish the guilt of the other defendant." 
These instructions told the jury that evidence admitted 
against Chierotti could not be used against Gonzales and that 
evidence admitted against Gonzales could not be used against 
Chierotti. They are ambiguous in failing to indicate to the 
jury what evidence was admitted against Gonzales and what 
evidence was admitted against Chierotti. The record, how-
ever, reveals that at the time evidence as to the acts and 
declarations of Gonzales was introduced, the court stated in 
the presence of the jury that the evidence was admitted 
against Gonzales and not against Chierotti, and that at the 
time evidence as to the acts and declarations of Chierotti was 
introduced the court stated that it was admitted against 
Chierotti and not against Gonzales. The instructions, there-
fore, read in conjun~tion with the statements of the court 
during the trial indicated to the jury that the acts and 
declarations of Gonzales could not be used to prove Chierotti 
a party to the conspiracy and that the acts and declarations 
of Chierotti could not be used to prove Gonzales a party 
thereto. Any error in the instructions because of their 
ambiguity was therefore not prejudicial to defendants. 
[7] Defendants contend the evidence is insufficient to 
establish that Chierotti participated in the conspiracy. Par-
ticipation in a conspiraey, however, can be shown by circum-
stantial evidence. (See cases cited in 5 Cal. JUl'. 521.) The 
evidence shows that a bag containing the money making ma-
chine and bottles of liquid was in Chierotti's apartment, that 
174 PEOPLE V. GONZALES [20 C. (2d) 
Chierotti had possession of the key to the lock on the bag, 
thatChierotti knew Gonzales, that Gonzales had been to 
Chierotti's apartment and was there on the Monday before 
the arr~ta were made, that Chierotti was seen leaving his 
apartment house with Gonzales carrying a bag, that Gonzales 
met with Chierotti shortly after leaving Valenzano's tavern, 
that Gonzales exhibited to Valenzano a large roll of bills but 
when Gonzales and Chierotti were arrested together shortly 
thereafter Chierotti· had possession of a large roll of bills 
but Gonzales. did not. This evidence is sufficient to justify the 
jury's conclusion that Chierotti participated with Gonzales in 
a . conspiracy to steal money from Valenzano by use of the 
pretended money making machine. 
[8] Any misconduct that may have existed on the prose-
cutor'sp'art in referring to other bunco cases and bunco 
game~ during the course of his argument to the jury is not 
sufficiently prejudicial to justify reversal, particularly since 
the trial court refused to grant a new trial on this ground. 
(See Imlay v. Oalifornia Oab 00., 124 Cal. App. 68 [11 P. 
(2d) 1116] ; Alberts v. Lytle, 1 Cal. App. (2d) 682 [37 P. 
(2d) 705].) . 
The judgment of conviction and orders denying a new trial 
are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Edmonds, J., con-
curred. 
CARTER, J., Dissenting.-I dissent. 
The rule followed by the majority opInlOn seriously im-
pairs the efficacy and sanctity of the constitutional guarantce 
against unlawfUl searches and seizures. (Cal. Const., art. I, 
sec. 19.) The particular issue is the competency of evidence 
in a criminal proceeding which bas been obtained from de-
fendant in violation of that constitutional prohibition. Al-
though it is my opinion that the same constitutional guarantee 
appearing· in the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States is applicable to states as well as federal 
agencies because it is one of the fundamental liberties em-
braced in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States, I will limit my discussion to theproposi-
tion that even if the right to be secure against unlawful 
searches and seizures is not protected by the federal Constitu-
tion with reference to state agencies, the provision in our 
.,' 
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state Constitution compels the rule that evidence obtained in 
contravention tbereof shall not be competent or admissible. 
It cannot be seriously questioned that to permit tbe use of 
evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional provision 
at least to some extent infringes upon the field of liberty se-
cured by the inhibition against unlawfUl searches and seizures. 
But it goes beyond a mere partial invasion. It in effect prac-
tically-destroys the right. That is true for the reason that the 
value of any right varies in direct proportion to the means 
afforded for the protection of the right; the realization of any 
benefit from the right is wholly dependent upon the existence 
of instruments for that purpose. If it may be violated and 
the fruits of the violation directed against the possessor of it, 
the fruita of it are lost, and it is no more than a bare abstrac-
tion. 
I take it that a person in preserving the right here in-
volved is justified in committing homicide. However, if he 
does not adopt that extreme mcasure, and in a well ordered 
social system that should be discouraged, he is faced with 
possibility that evidence obtained may be used against him. 
Certainly he shoUld be given credit and security rather than 
being penalized for failing to pursue such an extreme course. 
Permitting such evidence to be used is an invitation and 
encouragement to law cnforcing officials to violate the Con-
stitution. It gives them free reign to act upon mere suspicion 
and conjecture, to the harassment of the persons offended 
and to the end that the sanctity of his home or depository of 
his papers and effects is destroyed. It is of small comfort to 
. say that he has an action against the officers. In most in-
stances the amount of recovery would be negligible and the 
process costly. 
In Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 [34 S. Ct. 341, 58 
L. Ed. 652], it was stated with respect to this issue: 
"Judge Cooley, in his Constitutional Limitations, pp. 425, 
426, in treating of this feature of our Constitution said: 'The 
maxim that "every man's house js his castle" is made a part 
of our constitutional law in the clauses prohibiting unreason-
able searches and seizures, and has always been looked upon 
as of high value to the citizen.' 'Accordingly,' says Lieber 
in his work on Civil Liberty and Self-Government, 62, in 
speaking of the English la", in this respect, 'no man's house 
can be forcibly opened, or he or his goods be carried away 
after it has thus beeu forced, except in cases of felony; and 
. 
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then the sheriff must be furnished with a warrant, and take 
great, care lest he commit a trespass. This principle is jeaI-
:ously insisted upon.' In Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, 733, 
[24 L. Ed.' 877,879], this court recognized the principle of 
protection as applicable to letters and sealed packages in the 
mail, and held that, consistently .with this guarantee of the 
right of 'the peqple to be secure in their pa.pers against un-
reasonable searches and seizures, such matter could only be 
opened ~nd, examined upon warrants issued on oath or affir-
mation, particularly describing the thing to be seized, 'as is 
required when papers are subjected to search .in one's own 
household. ' 
"In the Boyd case, supra, after citing Lord Camden's 
judgment in E·ntick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, Mr. 
Justice Bradley said (630): 
" 'The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very 
essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach 
farther than the concrete form of the case then before the 
court, with its adventitious circumstances; they apply to. all 
invasions on the part of the government and its employees 
of the sanctity: of a man's home and the privacies of life. It 
is not the breaking of his doors and the rummaging of his ~, 
drawers that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is 
the invasion 6f his indefeasible right of personal security, per-
sonalliberty, and private property, where that right has never 
been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense,-it 
is the invasion of this sacred right which underlies and con-
stitutes the essence of Lord Camden's judgment.' " And 
again: 
"The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the 
guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to 
be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established 
byye8.1"8 of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in 
their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land." 
. In addition to the federal courts, the following states have 
adopted the rule that evidence obtained in violation of the 
Constitution is not admissible. (Florida, Idaho, lllinois, In-
diana, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
Oklab,oma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washing-
ton, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming.) (See 24 A. L. R. 
1408 ; ~2 id. 40&; 41 id. 1145; 52 id. 477; 88 id. 348; 134 id. 
819.) . 
'Obviously, the purpose and object of the constitutional pro-
TIsionin question was to guarantee security to the individual 
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against invasion of his premises by officers seeking evidence 
which might be used by them in a criminal prosecution with-
out making oath or affirmation particularly describing the 
place to be searched or the person or thing to be seized. In 
other words, it was contemplated by the framers of the Con-
stitution that before an officer should be permitted to secure 
evidence by means of a search and seizure, the facts support-
ing the claim of right to make the search should be submitted 
to a magistratc in the form of an affidavit, and if the magis-
trate determined such facts to be sufficient he would issue a 
warrant authorizing the search of premises particularly de-
scribed in the warrant and the seizure of the person or thing 
particularly described therein. To say that to permit the use 
of evidence acquired in violation of this constitutional pro-
vision docs not abrogate or destroy the constitutional right so 
guaranteed is to my' mind counterfeit logic. 
History reveals many abuses by public officers both in Eng-
land and colonial times in this country when officers invaded 
the premises of persons suspected of crimes, many of which 
have long since been abolished, and the papers and effects 
of innocent victims seized and used for the persecution as well 
HS prosecution of such victims. It was to prevent these abuses 
that the Fourth Amendment was added to the Constitution 
of the United States and section 19 of article I was incorpo-
rated in the Constitution of California. In my opinion there 
is no such urgency or necessity enjoined upon prosecuting 
officers today to obtain evidence of law violation which re-
quires them to violate a constitutional provision so specific 
in its prohibitions, and which has enshrined within its provi-
sions such sacred concepts of liberty, security and justice as 
the constitutional provision here in question. 
The more I read and hear about the tyranny of totalitarian-
ism as it pervades a large part of the world today, the more 
appreciative I am of the constitutional form of government 
and the constitutional guarantees which we have in this coun-
try and in this state. And every time I see an effort being 
made to abrogate or nullify by interpretation any of the con-
stitutional provisions designed to protect the life, liberty and 
property of the people, I shudder to contemplate what will 
happen if this disposition to abrogate and nullify these con-
stitutional provisions continues. I, for one, shall never yield 
to the doctrine that a con!3titutional provision designed to 
protect the life, liberty and property of the people of this 
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country should. be abrogated or nullified by interpretation. 
If political, social or economic conditions require changes in 
,our Constitution, such changes should be made by amending 
the Constitution in the manner prescribed by it, but it is not 
for the courts by their decisions to abrogate or nullify con-
stitutional provisions by interpretation or read into those pro-
visions that which was never intended to be included therein. 
In .my opinion it was prejudicial error requiring a reversal 
of the judgment for the trial court to admit the evidence 
obtained by the police officers as the result of the unlawful 
entry and search of the premises occupied by the defendants, 
and tHe judgment of conviction against them should therefore 
be reversed. 
Houser, J., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied April 30, 
1942. Carter, J., voted for a rehearing. 
[L. A. No. 17810. In Bank. Apr. 16, 1942.] 
FRANK SCULLY, Appellant, v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
et aI., Respondents. 
[1] Hospitals - Inmates - Estates - Fees of Guardian. - Under 
Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6660, as it stood prior to 1941, the secre-
tary of the Department of Institutions was not entitled to a 
judgment against the State for the amount of fees fixed by the 
probate court for services rendered as guardian. 
[2] 
[3] 
Public Officers-Removal-Will of Appointing Power.-Inas-
much as the term of the secretary of the Department of Insti-
tutions is' not fixed by law, the appointee holds office at the 
pleasure of the appointing power. (See Pol. Code, § 878.) 
Pleading-Conclusions-Right.-An allegation that the dis-
charge of an employee "was without right or foundation in law 
and justification in fact" must be regarded as a conclusion 
[2] See 21 Cal. Jur. 980; 22 R. C. L. 562. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Hospitals and Asylums, §14; [2] 
Public Officers, § 132; [3] Pleading, § 21. 
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where the applicable code section provides that he holds his 
office at the pleasure of the appointing power. 
APPEAL from a jUdgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Ruben S. Schmidt, JUdge. Affirmed. 
Action for a declaration as to whether a secretary of the 
Department of Institutions was entitled to certain fees as 
guardian and for a judgment therefor, and also for restora-
tion to his position following his discharge therefrom. Judg-
ment for defendants on the pleadings affirmed. 
Lucien A. Sauvage and A. Brigham Rose for Appellant. 
Earl Warren, Attorney General, and Alberta Belford, Dep-
uty Attorney General, for Respondents. 
OURTIS, J.-[l] Plaintiff, as secretary of the Depart-
ment of Institutions of the State of California, was appointed 
guardian of a number of estates of incompetent persons, and 
thereafter the probate court fixed the fees to which the guar-
dian was entitled in the several estates, which collectively 
amounted to the sum of $2,650. Plaintiff instituted this 
action to have it declared that he was entitled to said fees 
and for judgment in the amount of such fees. The first and 
second causes of action of the amended complaint set forth 
the above facts. The defendants moved for judgment on the 
pleadings and the court granted the motion. Plaintiff has 
appealed from said judgment. 
The judgment should be sustained, as section 6660 of the 
Welfare and Institutions Code in force prior to its amend-
ment in 1941, under which plaintiff was appointed and acted 
as such guardian of the estates of said incompetent persons, 
provided that "The secretary of the Department of Insti-
tutions shall serve as such guardian . . . and shall receive 
such reasonable fees for his services as such guardian ... 
as the court allows. Such fees shall be paid into the State 
treasury to become a part of and to be added to the appro-
p.riation or special fund in the State treasury, made available 
by law for the support or management of the department." 
[2] In a third cause of action plaintiff sought to be re-
stored to his position as sJcretary of the Department of Insti-
tutions from which he was discharged by the director of said 
